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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION -
NONRESIDENT INSURER'S SOLICITATION OF MODIFICA-
TION TO INSURANCE CONTRACT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT 
MINIMUM CONTACT WITH FORUM STATE TO SATISFY DUE 
PROCESS JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. August v. HBA 
Life Insurance Co., 734 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1984). 
A husband and wife, while residents of Arizona, obtained a hospital-
ization-surgical care policy from an Arizona life insurance company. 1 
After changing their residency to Virginia, the couple made a claim 
under the policy for medical expenses incurred at a Virginia hospital. 2 
The insurance company denied the claim. 3 In its letter of denial, the 
insurance company enclosed a policy modification contract for signature 
by the couple.4 The couple never signed the policy modification.s Alleg-
ing a breach of the insurance agreement, the couple obtained a default 
judgment against the insurance company in a Virginia state court. 6 The 
insurance company, which was not authorized to do business in Virginia, 
had no representative in Virginia and did not appear in the state court 
action. 7 
The couple then petitioned the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
relief under Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Code. 8 To secure 
the insurance money, which was to fund their bankruptcy plan, the 
couple asked the court to order the insurance company to pay the sum 
due under the default judgment.9 The bankruptcy court refused, ruling 
that the default judgment was void.1O The court found that the insurance 
company's contacts with the state of Virginia were insufficient to satisfy 
the due process requirements for the valid assertion of in personam juris-
I. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1984). The policy was 
renewable monthly subject to the insurer's right to adjust premium rates. Id. 
2. Jd. The couple paid regular monthly premiums to the insurance company on the 
policy. Four of the premiums were paid by checks drawn on the couple's account at 
a Virginia bank. !d. 
3. The letter of denial stated that the claim had been denied because the medical condi· 
tion involved originated prior to the effective date of the policy. Id. 
4. The policy modification contract provided: "[I]n addition to the exceptions, reduc-
tions and limitations contained in the policy ... no payment shall be made under 
the policy for loss ... which results directly or indirectly from .... [a]ny disease 
of the organs peculiar to females, [s]uffered by Sharon August." Id. 
5. Id. at 173. 
6. Jd. 
7. The insurance company was served with process under Virginia's long arm statute, 
VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 
168, 170 (4th Cir. 1984). 
8. 734 F.2d at 169. Chapter 13 provides a statutory scheme for the adjustment of 
debts of individuals with regular incomes. Pursuant to the scheme, the debtor is 
required to collect and reduce to money the property of his estate. The money is 
then used to fund the debtor's plan. 11 U.S.c. §§ 1301-30 (1982). 
9. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1984). 
10. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co. (In re August), 17 Bankr. 628 (Bankr. E.D. Va.), affd, 
No. CA82-0175-R (E.D. Va. May 26, 1982) (memorandum order), rev'd, 734 F.2d 
168 (4th Cir. 1984). 
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diction over the insurer. lIThe United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia affirmed this holding. 12 The Fourth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the insurance company's solicitation of the policy 
modification in Virginia was sufficient contact with the state constitution-
ally to validate Virginia's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the 
nonresident insurer. J3 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment l4 limits the 
power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a non-
resident defendant. 15 A judgment rendered in violation of due process is 
void and is not entitled to full faith and credit. 16 Due process encom-
passes two separate and distinct concepts that must be satisfied to vali-
date an in personam judgment against a defendant. First, the defendant 
must be given adequate notice of the suit and an opportunity to be 
heard. 1 7 Second, the defendant must be subject to the personal jurisdic-
tion of the court. 1 8 
The personal jurisdiction of a court over a defendant historically has 
been grounded upon the presence of the defendant within the territorial 
limits of the court. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 19 the Supreme Court held that a 
state court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant was 
valid only if the defendant was physically present in the forum state. 20 
The Court subsequently expanded the Pennoyer rule by developing the 
concept of constructive presence to justify a state court's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Thus, in St. Clair v. 
Cox, 2 1 the Court held that a nonresident corporation was present in any 
state in which it engaged in business.22 The Court went further in Kane 
v. New Jersey,23 finding the presence of a nonresident defendant in the 
II. Id. 
12. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., No. CA82-0175-R (E.D. Va. May 26, 1982) (memo-
randum order), rev'd, 734 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1984). 
13. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 173 (4th Cir. 1984). 
14. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part: "No State shall ... deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
IS. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). Compare Insurance 
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.1O 
(1982) (limitation as a matter of individualliberty), with World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) (limitation as a matter of state sov-
ereignty and federalism). 
16. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877). A valid state court judgment must be 
honored by other states under the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CON ST. art. IV, 
§ I. 
17. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313-14 (1950). 
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
19. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Penlloyer involved a collateral attack on a default judgment 
entered against a nonresident defendant. 
20. Id. at 733. 
21. 106 U.S. 350 (1882). 
22. !d. at 354-56. The Court rejected the established doctrine that a corporation is 
present only in the state of its incorporation. Id. 
23. 242 U.S. 160 (1916). 
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forum state through the nonresident's implied consent to suit there.24 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,25 the Court abandoned its 
use of the legal fiction of presence in determining the validity of a state 
court's in personam judgment against a nonresident defendant. Interna-
tional Shoe involved an attack on the state of Washington's assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation. The corporation 
was not "present" within the state in the traditional sense for several 
reasons: the corporation had no office in the state nor did it enter into 
contracts in the state; the corporation kept no merchandise in the state 
and made no in-state deliveries; the corporation had no salaried employ-
ees in the state, although it did utilize salesmen there to exhibit samples 
and solicit orders.26 Despite the corporation's lack of presence within 
the state, the Court held that Washington's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion was proper in this suit to recover payments due the state's unem-
ployment compensation fund. 27 In so holding, the Court set out a new 
jurisdictional test: A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant if there exist certain minimum contacts between 
the defendant and the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "28 
Since its decision in International Shoe, the Court has explained the 
minimum contacts requirement. In Shaffer v. Heitner,29 the Court stated 
that in jUdging minimum contacts it is necessary to focus on "the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."30 Thus 
stated, the minimum contacts analysis is one of balancing constitution-
ally recognized interests. The defendant's interest in being free from the 
burden of litigating in a distant forum3) is balanced against the state's 
interest in adjudicating the particular type of dispute involved.32 When a 
defendant's contacts with the forum state are substantial, the defendant 
incurs little burden litigating in that forum and the defendant's interest in 
being free from that burden will be overcome by the general interest of 
the state in seeing that its laws are enforced. 33 When a defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state are minimal, the burden of litigating in that 
24. Id. at 167. Kane involved an attack on the constitutionality of New Jersey's nonres-
ident motorist statute. The statute provided that any nonresident who drove an 
automobile on a New Jersey highway would be subject to suit in that state in any 
action arising out of operation of the automobile within the state. Id. at 165-66 n.l. 
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
26. Id. at 313-14. 
27. Id. at 321. 
28. /d. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940». 
29. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
30. /d. at 204. . 
31. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). No other 
interests of the defendant are relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. See Calder v. 
Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486 (1984) (refusal to recognize defendant's first amend-
ment free speech interests as part of the jurisdictional analysis). 
32. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
33. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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forum is great and the defendant's interest will be overcome only by a 
compelling state interest in the particular dispute involved.34 Compelling 
state interests can be found in disputes involving: (1) activities that are of 
direct economic importance to a state;35 (2) activities that are heavily 
regulated by the state;36 (3) the proper administration of the state's judi-
cial system;37 and (4) issues of substantive social importance to the 
state.38 
The Court has utilized a variety of factors in its application of the 
minimum contacts balancing test. These factors include: whether there 
has been some contact with the state that results from an affirmative act 
of the defendant;39 whether the cause of action arises out of or relates to 
the defendant's contact with the state;40 and whether the state has a com-
pelling interest in adjudicating the particular type of dispute involved.41 
Recently, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,42 the Court reaffirmed its 
use of this balancing test and restated the principle that a state's interest 
in adjudicating a particular dispute is properly a part of the due process 
analysis and may be given great weight when that interest is 
34. See Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1984). 
35. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (state's interest in 
collecting money due its unemployment compensation fund). 
36. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (insurance industry); 
see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (transportation), cited with approval 
in McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
37. See Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1984) (punishment for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery). 
38. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (state's interest in assur-
ing that its sick be adequately compensated by their insurance companies). 
39. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (defendant's involuntary contacts 
with the forum state, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis to sustain an assertion 
of in personam jurisdiction over him). 
40. Compare Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984) (oc-
casional purchases and trips unrelated to the cause of action, standing alone, are not 
a sufficient basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction), and Perkins v. Ben-
guet Con so!. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (continuous and systematic contact 
with the forum state unrelated to the cause of action is a sufficient basis for the 
assertion of in personam jurisdiction), with Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) 
(single contact with the forum state from which the cause of action arises is a suffi-
cient basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction), cited with approval in Mc-
Gee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
41. See Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1984) (compelling forum interest provides the basis for jurisdiction where it other-
wise would not exist). The plaintiffs interest is not a part of the minimum contacts 
analysis. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text. The plaintiffs contacts with the 
forum state, however, are relevant to the determination of the state's interest. A 
state's interest in adjudicating a dispute is increased as a plaintiffs contacts with the 
state increase. See Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486 (1984) (plaintiffs lack of 
contact with the forum state will not of itself defeat jurisdiction, but plaintiffs con-
tacts may be so significant as to permit jurisdiction where it otherwise would not 
exist). 
42. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). 
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compelling.43 
One of the first cases to utilize the interest of a forum state in its 
minimum contacts analysis was McGee v. International Life Insurance 
CO.44 In McGee, a California resident, the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy, obtained a default judgment in a California state court against the 
nonresident insurer.45 The insurer's only contacts with California con-
sisted of the delivery of the insurance contract into California by mail 
and the receipt of premium payments mailed from California.46 Because 
the contract sued upon was delivered into the forum state by an affirma-
tive act of the defendant and because the contract was executed in the 
forum state,47 the McGee Court held that due process did not preclude 
the California state court from entering a binding judgment against the 
insurer.48 In so holding, the McGee Court noted that a state "has a man-
ifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when 
their insurers refuse to pay claims. "49 
In August v. HBA Life Insurance Co. ,50 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit decided whether a nonresident insurer's contacts with the 
state of Virginia were sufficient to satisfy due process jurisdictional re-
quirements. 51 The insurer's only contacts with Virginia consisted of the 
solicitation of a modification of a policy held by residents of the state and 
the receipt of premium payments drawn on a Virginia bank. 52 The court 
made a two-fold analysis of Virginia's assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion over the nonresident insurer. 53 
First, the court decided whether Virginia's long arm statute author-
43. Id. at 2184-85; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984); see 
Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1982) (compelling interest in punishing failure to comply with court-ordered dis-
covery of jurisdictional facts provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
where it otherwise would not exist). For an argument that the forum state's interest 
is not properly a part of the jurisdictional analysis, see Lewis, The "Forum State 
Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling 
Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769 (1982). 
44. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
45. Id. at 221-22. 
46. /d. 
47. Id. There has been some disagreement as to whether the holding in McGee is lim-
ited to insurance contracts. Compare Webb v. Stanker & Galetto, Inc., 84 N.J. 
Super. 178, 201 A.2d 387 (interpreting McGee as limited to insurance contracts or 
contracts in which the state has a unique interest), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1964), 
with Terassee v. Wisconsin Feeder Pig Mktg. Coop., 202 So. 2d 330 (La. Ct. App. 
1967) (interpreting McGee as applicable to all contractual situations). 
48. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. 
49. Id. at 223. 
50. 734 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1984). 
51. Id. The minimum contacts analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis and is, 
necessarily, a most "imprecise inquiry." Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1481, 1482 
(1984). 
52. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1984). 
53. This type of analysis was previously enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Haynes v. 
Carr, Inc., 427 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.) (jurisdiction is proper only if a state statute 
permits service of process on the nonresident defendant, and the assertion of juris-
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ized service of process on the insurer. 54 The court noted that Virginia 
state courts have construed liberally the long arm statute55 and con-
cluded that service of process on the insurer was proper. 56 
Second, the court determined whether the insurer had sufficient con-
tacts with Virginia to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of due pro-
cess. 57 The court recognized that it was foreseeable by the insurer that a 
cause of action under the insurance policy might arise in another state. 
This foreseeability alone, however, was too tenuous to justify Virginia's 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident insurer. 58 There-
fore, the August court focused on the solicitation of the policy modifica-
tion by the insurer. 59 The court reasoned that although the suit did not 
arise out of the solicitation, the solicitation was substantially related to 
the cause of action, thus providing the state more power over the defend-
ant than it would have had if the solicitation were unrelated to the cause 
of action.60 The majority held that the solicitation, in addition to the 
acceptance of premium payments drawn on a Virginia bank, provided 
sufficient contact with Virginia to permit the state's assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident insurer. 61 
The dissent argued that the solicitation was not an attempt to mod-
ify the insurance policy and, therefore, that this contact with the forum 
state was insufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of due pro-
diction under the particular facts does not offend due process), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
942 (1970). 
54. Virginia's long arm statute, VA. CODE § 8.01-328.I(A) (1984 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
relevant part: 
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly 
or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's: 
I. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; or. . . 
7.Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this 
Commonwealth at the time of contracting. 
The term "person" includes any legal or commercial entity. Id. § 8.01-328. 
55. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1984); see Danville Ply-
wood Corp. v. Plain & Fancy Kitchens, 218 Va. 533,238 S.E.2d 800 (1977); John J. 
Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971). 
56. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1984). 
57. !d. at 172-73. The court utilized the jurisdictional test set forth in International 
Shoe. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
58. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1984). Due process 
requires more than foreseeability alone: 
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere 
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it 
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are 
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1985). 
59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The court distinguished McGee, noting 
that delivery into the forum state of the contract sued upon was absent from HBA's 
contacts with Virginia. August, 734 F.2d at 172. 
60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
61. August, 734 F.2d at 173. 
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cess.62 Even assuming an attempt to modify the policy, the dissent main-
tained that the minimum contacts requirement still was not satisfied 
because the solicitation was not undertaken until after the cause of action 
arose.63 Further, no business transaction between the parties had been 
conducted in Virginia because the policy modification agreement had 
never been executed.64 The dissenting opinion would hold that the in-
surer lacked sufficient contacts with the state of Virginia to permit 
jurisdiction.65 
It is the majority holding, however, that is consistent with the cur-
rent trend in cases reviewing the validity of an assertion of in personam 
jurisdiction over nonresidents. August is consistent with this trend in 
two ways. First, courts in many states have construed liberally seem-
ingly restrictive long arm statutes to permit service of process on nonresi-
dents whose activities within the state do not fall within a literal reading 
of the statute.66 
Second, the minimum contacts requirement has been greatly ex-
panded, particularly where the forum state has a substantial interest in 
the litigation.67 Although the defendant must have some contact with 
the forum state resulting from an affirmative act of the defendant to jus-
tify a state's exertion of personal jurisdiction over him,68 the state's inter-
est in adjudicating a particular type of dispute may be so compelling as to 
permit jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.69 
In August, the forum state had a compelling interest in providing its 
residents with an effective means of redress against nonresident insurers 
who refuse to pay claims. 70 In this era of high medical costs, even a 
relatively short hospital stay may be financially devastating to a claimant. 
Generally, such claimants cannot afford to bring suit against their insur-
ers in a foreign forum; as a result, the insurer becomes judgment proof 
and state resources must be used to pay for medical services.7) 
62. /d. at 173-74 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
63. /d. (Hall, J., dissenting). 
64. /d. at 174 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
65. /d. (Hall, J., dissenting). 
66. See, e.g., Waters v. Deutz Corp., 460 A.2d 1332 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1983); Mohamed v. 
Michael, 279 Md. 653, 370 A.2d 551 (1978); Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain & 
Fancy Kitchens, 218 Va. 533,238 S.E.2d 800 (1977). Legislatures from at least two 
states have reacted favorably to this trend. They have done away with attempting to 
categorize activities for the purpose of service of process and permit service on any 
nonresident whenever due process is not offended. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1970). 
67. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984); Insurance 
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.1O 
(1982). For examples of these substantial state interests see supra notes 35-38 and 
accompanying text. 
68. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
69. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984); see supra notes 34-
38 and accompanying text. 
70. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
71. Id. 
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The primary concern of the dissent in August is that the cause of 
action did not arise from the solicitation, which the majority utilized as 
the basis for jurisdiction.72 This concern is justified and has arisen in 
past cases to deny the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants. 73 When jurisdiction has been denied on this ground, how-
ever, there has been no finding of a compelling state interest in adjudicat-
ing the particular type of dispute involved. 74 The dissent failed to 
recognize that the state of Virginia has a compelling interest in providing 
its residents with an effective means of redress against insurers who re-
fuse to pay claims. Although not expressly relied upon by the majority, 
it is this compelling state interest that tips the balance in the minimum 
contacts analysis in August and provides the basis for jurisdiction. 
The majority in August was correct in holding that Virginia's asser-
tion of in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident insurer was proper. 
The solicitation of the policy modification was an affirmative act on the 
part of the insurer to make contact in the forum state.75 This contact 
was slight and, therefore, the burden on the insurer to litigate in Virginia 
was great.76 But the insurer's interest in being free from this burden was 
outweighed by the compelling interest of the state to assure that its resi-
dents have an effective means of redress against insurers who refuse to 
pay claims. 77 This compelling interest is evidenced by the devastating 
effect refusal to pay might have on residents of a state and on the state 
treasury78 and by the heavy regulation states have imposed on the insur-
ance industry.79 
As a result of the holding in August, insurance companies should be 
wary of engaging in any type of activity within a state relating to policies 
of insurance issued in other jurisdictions. If an insurer undertakes any 
contact within the forum state, the insurer will be subject to the state's 
72. August v. HBA Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 168, 173-74 (1984) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
73. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 
(1984); Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Aanestad v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
998 (1974). 
74. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984); Ro-
senberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (i923); Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 521 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). 
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
The exercise [of the privilege of conducting activities within a state] may 
give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are 
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires 
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most 
instances, hardly be said to be undue. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
76. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
79. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958); supra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
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valid assertion of in personam jurisdiction. so This result may appear 
harsh, but it is necessary to protect the interest of the state, an interest 
that has long been recognized as a factor to be considered in the four-
teenth amendment due process analysis.S ! 
Elizabeth Suzan VanLaningham-Miller 
80. See Tate v. Blue Cross, 59 Md. App. 206, 474 A.2d 1353 (1984). In Tate, the sole 
contact of the insurers with the state of Maryland was the partial payment of a 
medical claim. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found "no difficulty" in 
holding that this contact was sufficient to satisfy due process. [d. at 212, 474 A.2d 
at 1357. 
81. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. 
